Some bilingual societies exhibit a distribution of language skills that cannot be explained by economic theories that portray languages as pure communication devices. Such distribution of skills are typically the result of public policies that promote bilingualism among members of both speech communities (reciprocal bilingualism). In this paper I argue that these policies are likely to increase social welfare by diminishing economic and social segmentation between the two communities. However, these gains tend to be unequally distributed over the two communities. As a result, in a large range of circumstances these policies might not draw su¢ cient support. The model is built upon the communicative value of languages, but also emphasizes the role of linguistic preferences in the behavior of bilingual individuals..
Introduction
Language skills are typically attained in a sequential fashion. Individuals initially acquire a …rst language at home (native language or mother tongue) and later in their life they learn one or more second languages. It is well understood that the economic return on second language acquisition is particularly high in societies with multiple native languages. Indeed, a well functioning economy requires a common language, a lingua franca, and the majority language is usually the most e¢ cient candidate. If size does matter for e¢ ciency, what should be the role of a language with a relatively small number of native speakers in a multilingual environment?
Indeed, some policies that promote the learning and use of minority languages are constantly scrutinized and often heavily criticized. Even more so in societies where all minority speakers are also competent in the majority language and hence the ability to communicate is not at stake. In this context, does it make any sense to promote the learning of a minority language among members of the majority speech community? Can such reciprocal bilingualism generate any economic gains, given that these additional skills are apparently redundant?
These are the main questions I address in this paper. I build on an extensive literature that has taken an economic approach to study languages. Since the distribution of language skills a¤ects economic outcomes (see, for example, Mélitz (2008) on international trade, and Chiswick (2008) on labor market outcomes), economists have also paid attention to the incentives to acquire second languages. The standard game-theoretic analysis (Selten and Pool,1991; Church and King, 1993) 1 portrays di¤erent languages as alternative communication devices. Individuals decide whether or not to acquire a second language by comparing the learning costs (in terms of time and money) with the bene…ts (the ability to communicate and do business with members of other speech communities.) An important ingredient of this approach is the presence of network externalities: the value of knowing a language increases with the number of its speakers. When they take decisions in isolation, individuals do not internalize such externalities and hence, with respect to the social optimum, underinvest in language skills. In other words, the private return on second language acquisition is lower than the social return, which opens the door to e¢ ciency-enhancing public policies.
Models based exclusively on the communicative value of languages have signi…-cantly contributed to our understanding of the relation between language skills and economic outcomes. However, they are somehow put under stress when we examine bilingual societies where monoglots of the minority language practically do not exist and as a result communication is guaranteed by the universal knowledge of the majority language. Below I pay particular attention to three European regions that meet this criterion: Wales, the Basque Country and Catalonia. Regarding the acquisition of a second language, we observe that a fraction of the majority speech community do learn the minority language. On top of that, native speakers of the minority language, despite the fact that they are bilingual, transmit the minority language to the next generation.
2 Regarding economic outcomes, there is some empirical evidence indicating that bilingual individuals enjoy a comparative advantage with respect to monoglots of the majority language in labor markets. Thus, markets seem to price positively the knowledge of the minority language for reasons beyond its communicative value.
In contrast to most of the economic literature, sociolinguists have always emphasized that a language is much more than a communication device. Language and culture are tightly interconnected and both impact on a person's identity. As a result, when people chooses which language to use, learn or transmit, they take into account not only relative communicative advantages but also their emotional attachment. Using the economics jargon we can say that individuals develop preferences about the language they use daily and eventually transmit to the next generation.
The notion of linguistic preferences has already been implicitly or explicitly used in a variety of contexts. Wickström (2005) builds a dynamic model to examine the 2 The implications of the traditional approach on the pattern of intergenerational transmission of languages have not been completely spelled out. Suppose that bilingual parents can only transmit one language. If they care about the welfare of their children then they will prefer to transmit the majority language and minimize their children'subsequent learning costs. The problem becomes more complicated if bilingual parents can transmit both languages. However, provided that in this case they incur into an incremental transmission cost, then the minority language will be expected to gradually disappear. John and Yi (2001) develop a dynamic model of language learning and transmission, focusing exclusively on the communicative value of languages. Unfortunately, decisions about intergenerational language transmission are not formalized as the solution of an optimization problem, but rather represented by a reduced form. Nevertheless, in their model the long-run survival of minority languages requires geographic isolation. 3 In particular, bilingual individuals face better job opportunities and obtain higher earnings. See Drinkwater and O'Leary (1997) and Henley and Jones (2005) for the case of Wales, and Rendon (2007) and Di Paolo and Raymond (2012) for the case of Catalonia. survival of minority languages. In his framework the intergenerational transmission of languages implicitly depends not only on the practical value of the language as means of communication, but also on the emotional attachment of the parents. However, linguistic preferences are not speci…ed and decisions about language transmission are represented by a reduced form. Similarly, Grin (1992) presents a dynamic model to study the evolution of language use. Linguistic preferences are explicitly speci…ed, but the set of decisions that determine the evolution of language skills are not (he also takes a reduced form approach). 4 In a di¤erent vein, Iriberri and Uriarte (2012) examine the role of the information structure in determining the use of minority languages in occasional social interactions. In their model language skills and preferences are …xed. Finally, in a previous paper (Caminal, 2010) , I
studied the provision of linguistic diversity in markets for cultural goods and media products. Like Iriberri and Uriarte, I assume a …xed distribution of language skills and preferences.
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In this paper I ignore the long-run dynamics of language use and transmission, and instead focus on the role of linguistic preferences in the feedback between the distribution of language skills and economic outcomes. I argue that the propensity to cooperate with members of other speech communities does not only depend on the ability to communicate but also on the potential con ‡ict of interests over the language of use. In other words, while I build on the communicative value of languages I also emphasize that multilingual individuals are not indi¤erent about the language of use in di¤erent types of social and economic interactions. The model is static in the sense that linguistic preferences are exogenous, but language skills are endogenously determined. In combination with network externalities, linguistic preferences drastically change the welfare assessment of alternative distributions of language skills. In particular, I claim that policies that promote reciprocal bilingualism (everyone learning the other, non-native language), by limiting the scope of the con ‡ict over the language of use, can improve the patterns of cooperation in society and generate signi…cant welfare gains. 4 Consequently, neither of these two models is suitable for welfare analysis. 5 In the context of a monopolistically competitive model I show that, with respect to the social optimum, market outcomes are biased in favor of stronger languages. In other words, markets provide too little linguistic diversity.
6 Clearly, linguistic preferences have a social component closely related to ethnic or national identity. The analysis in this paper clearly falls short in this dimension. On top of the e¤ects studied here, reciprocal bilingualism may reduce interethnic con ‡ict by reducing observable differences. However, some groups may oppose policies that promote reciprocal bilingualism if they
The next section reviews a sample of bilingual countries and regions in Europe and North America. The sample is admittedly small, but nevertheless su¢ ciently rich to re ‡ect a large variety of situations, both in terms of the relative strength of the two languages and the propensities of members of each community to become bilingual. It is emphasized that in some of these regions we observe a distribution of language skills that can not be explained by the communicative value of languages.
However, it also becomes readily apparent that examples exhibiting high levels of reciprocal bilingualism are hard to …nd. Both observations are rationalized by the theoretical model. Sections 3 and 4 examine a simple model that illustrates the main trade-o¤s.
I consider the impact of alternative distributions of language skills in a bilingual society (the two languages are labeled S and W ) where individuals obtain economic gains from cooperating with others. These cooperative tasks, or partnerships, require communication and hence the use of a particular language. Some high productivity partnerships include two individuals with di¤erent mother tongues. Hence, as in traditional models, cooperation requires partners to share a common language.
In this framework the ability to communicate is not su¢ cient in order to materialize all potential gains from cooperation because individuals have linguistic preferences (although they di¤er in the intensity of those preferences.) Those individuals with a strong preference for using their mother tongue are willing to give up the extra economic gains from a high productivity partnership in exchange for a better linguistic match. More speci…cally, in the regime where only W native speakers become bilingual (asymmetric bilingualism), then any high productivity match between two linguistically heterogeneous individuals must use language S. As a result, those W native speakers with a strong preference for the use of their mother tongue will choose to quit the high productivity match and settle in a linguistically homogeneous, lower productivity match. The privately optimal separation rule is not socially optimal because the potential partner (in this case, a S speaker) losses with the separation. Alternatively, in the regime where members of both speech communities become bilingual (reciprocal bilingualism) the fraction of ine¢ cient separations is lower. The reason is twofold. First, the distribution of language skills is symmetric and cooperation can take place in either language. Hence, there is a higher chance that at least one of the members of the match feels less strongly perceive them as a threat to their identity. about the language of use and accepts conducting the tasks in her second language.
Second, it becomes possible to adopt a more balanced pattern of language use (say, …fty-…fty), which again makes unilateral separations less likely.
7 As a result, provided learning costs are not too high, reciprocal bilingualism is socially optimal because it minimizes economic and social segmentation.
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The distributional implications of shifting from the …rst to the second regime are not trivial. It is clear that W native speakers always gain since the frequency of ine¢ cient separations decreases and, moreover, they enjoy a more favorable linguistic treatment. However, even abstracting from learning costs, the e¤ect on S native speakers is ambiguous. On the one hand, they bene…t from less frequent ine¢ -cient separations, yet on the other hand lose their power to impose their preferred language.
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The model must be closed by specifying how learning decisions are taken. Several alternative scenarios are considered. In the …rst scenario (following the standard literature) learning decisions are taken by individuals. Such an assumption may not be very suitable in some cases. In particular, the examples reviewed in Section 2 indicate that public policies are essential in determining the distribution of language skills. Thus, we need to consider the case that learning patterns are the result of some kind of collective action. An important aspect is the choice of jurisdiction, at least in cases where speech communities are geographically segmented. Thus, I
explore a second scenario where learning decisions are taken by two di¤erent bodies, each representing the interests of a speech community. These two scenarios do not necessarily provide the same answer, since individual decisions may also generate an externality on other members of their speech community. Finally, in the third scenario decisions are centralized. In this case the speci…c characteristics of the political system are crucial to predict how possible con ‡icts of interests may be 7 In the present model di¤erences in language skills prevent exploiting all the gains from cooperation. In the real world these di¤erences may be also used to generate monopolistic rents by, for instance, restricting the access of certain jobs to speakers of a particular language. A model capturing such rent seeking activities would provide additional channels by which reciprocal bilingualism is bound to raise social welfare. 8 There is a sizable literature on occupational segregation by race and ethnicity. See Patel and Vella (2007) or Hellerstein and Neumark (2008) for recent examples. Language seems an important part of these stories. However, the existing data does not allow us to separate the ability to communicate from linguistic preferences.
9 Lazear (1999) examines the incentives of immigrants to form ghettos in order to avoid the costs of learning the majority language (or, more generally, the costs of assimilation). In my model segmentation occurs also because bilingual individuals have linguistic preferences. resolved.
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Section 5 presents various extensions of the baseline model, including heterogeneous learning costs, the possibility of using monetary compensations in exchange for a more favorable language treatment, the size of cooperation groups, and the weight of speech communities. Finally, Section 6 presents some concluding remarks.
2 The distribution of language skills in bilingual societies Lieberson, 1964) and an index of reciprocity (a natural extension) between speech communities. In particular, if we denote by i the fraction of i native speakers that are competent in j; i; j = S; W; i 6 = j; then we can de…ne the index of communication, C, as:
This index takes values between 0 and 1, and measures the probability that in an heterogenous bilateral match (one S and on W speaker) there is at least one common language, and hence subjects can communicate. We can also de…ne the index of reciprocity, R, as
Note that R also takes values between 0 and 1 and measures the fraction of redundancies. That is, in an heterogeneous bilateral match R measures the probability that both individuals are bilingual, and hence from a strictly communicative point of view one of the languages is redundant.
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Thus, in the …rst scenario (SB) we have C = R = 0; in the second (AB) C = 1, R = 0; and in the third (RB) C = R = 1.
Next, let us brie ‡y discuss a sample of bilingual regions or countries and whether they exemplify the three extreme scenarios mentioned above. (Aitchison and Carter, 2004) .
The education reforms in the late 1980's were a crucial driving force by making
Welsh compulsory in schools up to age 16.
Data about mother tongues is more readily available for the Basque Country.
Spanish is the native language of 78% of the population, while the other 22% report
Basque as their mother tongue (Gobierno Vasco, 2006) . As in the case of Wales, all Basque speakers know the dominant language (Spanish, in this case). However, a signi…cant 13% of the native Spanish speakers also know Basque. In fact, Basque is compulsory in schools and recently has become the main language of instruction for two thirds of students in primary and secondary school.
Both Wales and the Basque Country seem to deviate from the AB scenario.
Since all native speakers of the minority language do learn the dominant language, in terms of the ability to communicate native speakers of the majority language do not need to learn the minority language: their learning e¤orts appear somewhat redundant. Nevertheless, some of them do it under a policy scheme that can be interpreted as a gesture of reciprocity.
Let us turn now to case where a non-negligible fraction of both speech com- If we take Canada a whole as the reference area then the relative size of these two 13 These …gures cannot be directly computed from census data. In order to pin down these coe¢ cients I have assumed that those individuals whose mother tongue is a non-o¢ cial language (12%) learn either French or English in proportion to the size of these two speech communities. If some members of this group learn them both then the real value of these two coe¢ cients would be smaller. coe¢ cients would be reversed, since few English native speakers outside Quebec know French.
From a linguistic point of view Belgium can be divided into three regions: Flanders, populated mainly by Dutch native speakers (almost 60% of the Belgian population), Wallonia, populated mainly by French native speakers (more than 30% of the population) and Brussels, one of the capitals of the European Union, a melting pot of Belgian citizens and foreigners, where French is somewhat more predominant than Dutch. This is why I have chosen the entire country as our reference area, as otherwise we end up with linguistically homogeneous regions. According to Van Parijs (2007) , just 15% of French native speakers acquire Dutch as a second language, while more than one half of Dutch speakers learn French. Thus, in this speci…c case the incentives to become bilingual seem to be much stronger for Dutch speakers, not because of domestic reasons (the French speaking community accounts for less than 40% of the total population) but rather due to the value of French as a lingua franca. The values of 's reported above are easily explained by the course o¤ers of second languages, which are independently determined by each region (Desmet and Vermeire, 2000) .
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The patterns of second-language learning in Belgium and Quebec are compatible with the traditional theory of languages as pure communication devices (Gabsewitz et al., 2008) . In both cases a signi…cant fraction of the two linguistic communities can a¤ord to remain monolingual. However, many others do become fully bilingual. A positive level of reciprocity (as measured by our index) is consistent with the traditional theory since it is privately optimal that individuals learn a second language in order to gain access to the monoglots in the other community. In other words, from a purely communicative point of view their learning e¤orts may very well not be redundant in expectation.
However, the standard theory cannot explain the patterns of language acquisition in Wales and the Basque Country. Since everybody there speaks English or Spanish the learning e¤orts of the members of the dominant speech community seem redundant. However, the fraction of individuals with presumably anomalous 14 Several former soviet republics exhibit language patterns similar to those in Belgium and Quebec. According to Ukraine's 2001 Census and Latvia's 2011 Census, about two thirds of the population consider the local languages (Ukrainian and Latvian) their mother tongue, and the other third report Russian. While two-thirds of native speakers of the local language also speak Russian, the fraction of Russian native speakers that also speak the local language vary from 12% in Ukraine to 60% in Latvia.
behavior is relatively small, and hence some observers may not value them as forceful counterexamples. In this respect our last example, Catalonia, is more striking.
In this region the degree of reciprocal bilingualism is exceptionally high. In a recent survey (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2008) , 32% of the population reported Catalan, while 57% reported Spanish as their mother tongue. 15 As in the Basque Country, all native Catalan speakers also know Spanish. What is more unusual is that about 75% of the Spanish native speakers also speak Catalan. Thus, the degree of reciprocal bilingualism is not too far from its maximum.
A crucial determinant of the widespread knowledge of Catalan among Spanish native speakers is the language policy of the regional government. The explicit aim is universal bilingualism and the main …eld of intervention is the school system where Catalan is the main language of instruction. 16 It is noteworthy that those policies have enjoyed a broad social consensus. Over the last thirty years policies that promote Catalan, and determine its privileged role in compulsory education, have only been challenged by small political parties that together never represented more than 15% of the seats in the regional parliament. In fact, casual evidence suggests that the language policy of the Catalan government has been contested much more strongly in the rest of Spain than in Catalonia. Second, examples with high levels of R are hard to …nd.
One could perhaps try to explain the …rst observation by invoking some kind of distortion in the political system. I doubt there exists a plausible political model that will be able to explain the broad political consensus in Catalonia. The second observation could perhaps be interpreted as an indication that reciprocal bilingualism is not able to generate sizable social gains. This paper o¤ers an alternative view: reciprocal bilingualism may cause a relatively large increase in social welfare, but in many scenarios it might fail to gather su¢ cient political support because those gains tend to be unequally distributed across speech communities.
The benchmark model
Consider an economy populated by a mass one of individuals, whose …rst language is either S or W: For now suppose that the two speech communities have the same size. The …rst language or mother tongue will determine the linguistic preferences of bilingual individuals according to the pattern speci…ed below.
18 It is important to note than in these regions native speakers of minority languages learn the majority language and nevertheless they pass the minority language on to the next generation. See Fabà and Llaberia (2011) for the case of Catalonia. Linguistic preferences appear as an essential ingredient of any relevant explanation of such transmission pattern.
Learning a second language provides two types of return. First, it facilitates domestic interactions. This is the main focus of the analysis, and hence these type of bene…ts are endogenous. Second, the newly acquired language may also be useful in non-domestic interactions and/or may provide access to the stock of media and cultural goods supplied in that language. These latter bene…ts will be described by a …xed (exogenous) parameter, B i ; i = S; W . Without loss of generality, let
In other words, despite of the fact the two communities have the same size, S is a relatively stronger language, because of its non-domestic status.
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Individuals play the following two-stage game. In the …rst stage, they may acquire a second language by incurring a cost F (same for both S and W ): An individual that learns a second language becomes equally functional in both languages, but this does not imply that is indi¤erent about the language used in any social interaction. For the moment I assume that each individual pays its own learning cost.
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In the second stage, once the language skills of the population are …xed, individuals obtain the two types of returns on their learning e¤orts. Regarding the exogenous bene…ts I will …rst focus on the case B S > F and B W = 0. The …rst assumption, B S > F , implies that W native speakers have always incentives to learn S: the only possible equilibrium scenarios are AB and RB. The second assumption, B W = 0, is a normalization, since S native speakers will take their learning decisions depending on whether the endogenous bene…ts from learning W are higher or lower than the "net costs", F B W : As for the endogenous bene…ts, I assume that each individual can potentially form a high productivity partnership only with a particular individual that is randomly selected from the entire population. Everyone has the same probability of becoming an individual's potential partner, independently of their language skills and preferences. A high productivity partnership can only be formed if partners can communicate with each other (if they share at least one language) and if they reach an agreement over the language of communication. If the partnership materializes then payo¤s depend on the language used. An i native speaker obtains 1 if i is adopted as the language of 19 For instance, in the case of Belgium, French would be the stronger language, S; since it is more valuable than Dutch as an international lingua franca. Similarly, in the case of Catalonia it is also obvious that Spanish is the stronger language.
20 Alternatively, we can best think of F as the total cost, including the time and e¤ort that individuals must exert, but also the …nancial expenses (classrooms, books, etc.), which can perhaps be funded by general taxation. Such a distinction will become important when we examine the distributional e¤ects of public policies.
communication. On the contrary, she obtains 1 if j; j 6 = i; is adopted. is an independent realization of a random variable distributed over 0;
with density function h ( ) and distribution function H ( ) : Let us denote by b the unconditional average. Summarizing, each partner obtains a monetary return of 1 from a high productivity partnership, and re ‡ects the disutility (measured in monetary units) associated to the use of a second language.
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Thus, communication in a high productivity partnership can take place in S or in W: But it can also take place in both languages (on a …fty-…fty basis), a regime denoted by SW . In this case, each individual obtains 1 , where
is an exogenous parameter. That is, the utility loss from using a second language half of the time is less or equal than one half the loss from using a second language all the time. If interpreted literally, this assumption indicates that the marginal disutility of using the second language for an additional unit of time (weakly) decreases with the amount of time using the second language. Alternatively, a …fty-…fty arrangement can also be interpreted as if both partners are in fact able to use their native language. In a two-person environment this may simply mean that individuals can send messages in their native language but they receive messages in their second language. A parameter lower than 1 2 may re ‡ect the fact that individuals care relatively more about the language of the messages they send than of the messages they receive. 22 Finally, 1 2 may simply re ‡ect equity considerations: Using a fair scheme may be jointly perceived as more desirable than any extreme pattern.
If the highly productive partnership does not form, then the expected payo¤ for each individual in the alternative activity is 1 < 1. Such a payo¤ can be interpreted as the monetary return obtained in a less productive activity that does not require the use of a language. Similarly, it may be the return from cooperating with other available members of the same speech community.
For simplicity, it is assumed that in the …rst stage individuals only know the distribution of (all individuals are ex-ante identical in this respect), and privately 21 can represent indistinctively a pure preference for using the mother tongue or the limited competence in the second language, and hence the extra e¤ort needed to communicate using that language. Vaillancourt (1982) shows that, in the case of francophones in Quebec, the preference for using their mother tongue in consumption activities weakens as their ‡uency in English improves, Nevertheless, those individuals with excellent knowledge of English still have a pure preference for using French. 22 In the context of more complex organizations, multilateral communication can take place simultaneously in more than one language. Thus, an SW regime may simply mean that each individual can communicate with the center in her native language and the use of the second language is limited to interactions in small groups learn their realization at the beginning of the second stage, right before they meet their potential partners. At this point, both their native language and knowledge of a second language are common knowledge. The only dimension that remains private information is their own realization of . Such asymmetry of information appears as a reasonable representation of the real world and will play a crucial role in the analysis. In Section 5 I comment on the e¤ects of the imperfect observability of language skills and native languages. 23 Also, for simplicity it is assumed that potential partners negotiate over the language of communication using a very simple bargaining protocol. 24 The three possible linguistic regimes are S; W or SW: When potential partners meet one of them is chosen with equal probability as the proponent, who makes a take-it-orleave-it o¤er within the set (S; SW; W ) : The respondent either accepts or rejects the o¤er. If both members of the potential partnership belong to the same speech community there is obviously no obstacle in using the common native language as the language of communication. However, if they belong to di¤erent speech communities then the strategic incentives will depend on their language skills and their values of .
It is important to note that, for the moment, potential partnerships are not price mediated. In other words, the distribution of monetary surplus is …xed and unconditional to language skills or the language of communication. This is probably a good description of many types of social interactions where it is impossible to price discriminate on the basis of the individual's linguistic attributes. In any case price mediated agreements are examined in Section 5.
Imposing some restrictions on parameter values will simplify the presentation without signi…cantly a¤ecting the main economic insights. In order to interpret these restrictions it will be useful to outline some features of equilibrium behavior. If both potential partners of the productive match share the same mother tongue, then the match is formed with probability one, since the relationship can be conducted in their favorite language and everyone obtains a payo¤ equal to 1; which is higher than their opportunity cost, 1 . However, if one of them, say the W native speaker, is bilingual but the S speaker is monolingual, then, independently of who is the proponent, the partnership will materialize if and only if is pro…table for the W native speaker: if and only if 1 1 : Finally, if partners have di¤erent mother tongues but are both bilingual, then their optimal strategies are more complicated since all three regimes (S; SW; W ) are feasible.
Assumption 1 2
Assumption 1 indicates that from a social point of view all feasible (at least one bilingual individual) high productivity partnerships should be formed. In other words, for all values of , total payo¤s from forming the initial match, 2 ; are higher than their opportunity cost, 2 (1 ) : In other words, high productivity partnerships are always socially e¢ cient.
Asumption 2 > :
Assumption 2 implies that there exist some bilingual individuals (with a su¢ -ciently high value of ) that will reject the e¢ cient partnership if the language of communication is her second language. Assumptions 1 and 2 taken together imply that ine¢ cient separations will occur with a positive probability when one of the communities is monolingual.
Note that 1 2
. The …rst inequality comes from the assumption that 1 2
; and the second follows from Assumption 1: Hence, for all values of bilingual individuals will willing to form the partnership if an SW policy is adopted.
Neither of these assumptions is essential in the derivation of the main qualitative results, but they greatly simplify the presentation by reducing the number of cases under consideration.
The model laid down in this section is static. A possible, and more elegant, alternative would be to introduce linguistic preferences in the standard dynamic model of the labor market with matching frictions. Suppose that coalitions collapse at some exogenous rate and freed individuals are matched with potential partners also at some exogenous rate. Matched individuals negotiate the conditions of cooperation. If they reach an agreement, which will depend on their linguistic preferences, then the coalition is formed, otherwise individuals remain "unemployed" and wait until the next opportunity arrives. In a model like this reciprocal bilingualism will also increase the probability that a match actually forms a coalition, cutting down "unemployment" spells. Such a model would certainly be more elegant, but much less tractable. On top of that I doubt it would be able to bring about additional insights. In other words, the proposed model can probably be thought of as a simple representation of a labor market subject to matching frictions.
Analysis of the benchmark model
Since S > F , W native speakers have always incentives to learn S; independently of the potential bene…ts arising from domestic interactions. Hence, the only two possible equilibrium scenarios are AB and RB.
Asymmetric bilingualism
Suppose that at the second stage W speakers are bilingual but S speakers remain monolingual. Half of the potential high productivity partnerships will be formed by linguistically homogeneous individuals who will face no obstacle reaching an agreement. However, the other half of the matches includes two individuals with di¤erent mother tongues. Obviously, the language of use must necessarily be S, and the partnership will materialize if and only if it is individually rational for the W speaker; i.e., if and only if 1 1 , a condition that is independent of the identity of the proponent: As a result, the respective expected payo¤s of S and W speakers will be given by:
Thus, a fraction 1 H ( ) of productive partnerships formed by linguistically heterogeneous individuals will fail, and a fraction H ( ) will succeed. In a successful partnership only the W speakers bears the cost of using their second language. As
Reciprocal bilingualism
Suppose now that at the second stage both communities are bilingual. In linguistically heterogeneous matches, if the proponent is an S speaker (the situation is perfectly symmetric if the proponent is a W speaker) she anticipates that o¤er-ing an SW policy will be accepted with probability one by the potential partner.
Hence, she has no incentive to o¤er W . If she o¤ers SW then she obtains 1 . In the event she proposes S then she anticipates that with probability H ( ) the o¤er will be accepted, but with the complementary probability the potential partner will quit. Hence, she obtains a expected payo¤ equal to 1 [1 H ( )] . Therefore, she …nds it optimal to o¤er SW if only if [1 H ( )] : Note that in principle may be higher or lower than . If , then independently of the identity of the proponent, the partnership will materialize with probability one and the language policy will be SW . As a result U Consequently,
where p and r are the respective expected utility of the proponent and the respondent, which can be written as:
Combining these expressions we obtain
In contrast to the previous scenario, now speech communities are in a symmetric situation and hence all individuals obtain the same expected payo¤.
Comparing alternative scenarios
The computations are presented for the case < , but the qualitative results also hold in case .
Let us …rst focus on total surplus, T S. In this case the total gains derived from shifting from AB to RB, T U
can be written as:
Let us compare the negotiation outcomes in heterogeneous matches across the two regimes. Let S and W be the realizations of the disutility parameter of the S and W speaker, respectively. In the AB regime the identity of the proponent is irrelevant, since all that matters is the realization of W . Also, both speech communities have the same ex-ante preferences. Hence, the total expected surplus in the RB regime is also independent of the identity of the proponent. Thus, we only need to compare the negotiation outcomes in the two regimes when the S speaker is the proponent. If S > then both the RB and AB regimes deliver the same outcome, i.e., the S speaker o¤ers to conduct the relationship in S and the respondent accepts if and only if W < . However, the two regimes di¤er if S < : In this case, the match breaks down in the AB regime if and only if W > ; but never breaks down in the RB regime. Thus, ine¢ cient separations are less likely in the RB regime. Also, total costs of using a second language varies across regimes. If W < the relation is then conducted in S in the AB regime and in SW in the RB regime. Hence, there could be realizations of S and W for which the total surplus generated in the AB regime may be higher than in the RB regime. However, even when takes its highest possible value ( = 1 2 ), these realizations cannot a¤ect the sign of the total change in expected surplus, which is mainly driven by the reduction in ine¢ cient separations.
It is important to note that T increases as decreases. In other words, if individuals value an SW policy (lower ) more, then the social bene…ts of reciprocal bilingualism increase.
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Whether or not RB is socially optimal clearly depends on the di¤erence between costs and bene…ts:
26 Proposition 1 Reciprocal bilingualism is socially optimal if and only if F T .
Let us now look at the distributional implications of shifting from AB to RB.
We know that U S AB > U W AB and U W RB = U S RB : Moreover, average welfare increases, which taken together with the previous results implies W speakers must be better 25 RB also raises welfare if the SW regime is not feasible and individuals must select either S or W . 26 In our social welfare function all individuals have the same weight (the social planner maximizes total surplus). If, alternatively, the social planner is averse to inequality, then in principle it should promote RB more vigorously, since AB generates inequality by favoring the S-community. Or course, if we take into account other determinants of individual welfare (like monetary wealth) then distributional concerns may turn against RB if S-speakers are relatively poorer. In any case, I …nd the idea of using language policy as a redistribution device quite inappropriate. o¤ in the RB regime:
The reason is twofold. First, the frequency of ine¢ cient separations is lower in the RB regime. Second, whenever high productivity partnerships succeed, W speakers obtain a better linguistic treatment.
In contrast, the e¤ect on S speakers is much less straightforward. In particular: Proposition 2 If F 2 max F S ; 0 ; T and S speakers bear the full cost of learning W , then they will prefer not to acquire a second language even though it would raise total surplus.
Obviously, if some of the learning costs are covered by general taxation (and hence paid by W speakers) then S speakers incentives would improve. However, as shown above, even if W speakers o¤er to fully compensate S speakers for their learning costs, they would still refuse if U S < 0.
Extensions

Heterogeneous learning costs
Suppose that individuals face di¤erent learning costs (like in Gabszewicz et al., 2008) . Now the cost of learning a second language for an individual, F; is an independent realization of a random variable distributed over 0; F , with density function j (F ) and cumulative distribution J (F ). It is still assumed that B Finally, the analog of Proposition 2 would be the following:
Remark 1 If F > U S , the fraction of bilingual S speakers is ine¢ ciently low.
Starting at the equilibrium value, a small exogenous increase in S generates second order losses on the additional bilingual S speakers, but …rst order gains in W speakers, who now face bilingual S speakers more often.
Asymmetric information on language skills
An alternative, perhaps more realistic, scenario is one where heterogeneity of learning costs interacts with additional dimensions of asymmetric information and/or some kind of institutional inertia. More speci…cally, suppose that both native language and knowledge of the second language of potential partners are not observable, or at least they are not observable at the time of choosing strategies. The latter can be interpreted as a form of institutional inertia, where the language policy of various organizations is set by members of one of the two speech communities before they actually learn the identities of their potential partners. In other words, I assume the proponent sets language policy as a function of S but ignoring the identity of the potential partner; that is, a W speaker ignores whether the potential partner is another W speaker, a monolingual S speaker, or a bilingual S speaker. Similarly, an S speaker does not know whether the potential partner is another S speaker or a bilingual W speaker.
The details of the analysis are postponed to the Appendix. Here I provide a brief summary of results. As expected, in this case the strategy of W speakers as proponents varies with S : In particular, a higher value of S induces W speakers to o¤er S less often and SW more often. As a result, a partnerships between a W speaker and a monolingual S speaker is less likely to succeed. Also, even though the probability of a success of a partnership between a W -speaker and a bilingual S speaker does not change with S ; the latter expects a worse language treatment. Summarizing, the learning decision of an individual S speaker generates a negative externality on the rest of her speech community. However, the positive externality they generate on W speakers is even larger, at least for a set of distribution functions that includes the uniform.
Remark 2 The equilibrium value of S is likely to be ine¢ ciently low, but it would be even lower if learning decisions where taken in order to maximize the welfare of the S community.
Price-mediated agreements
How do results change if the division of monetary surplus is not exogenous, but part of the negotiation? More speci…cally, suppose that the proponent makes a take-itor-leave-it o¤er that includes not only a language policy but also a division of the monetary return: x for the respondent and 2 x for the proponent. The respondent must accept or reject the entire o¤er. The main insights of this exercise can be obtained by restricting our attention to the case where is uniformly distributed
Note that in a linguistically homogeneous match the average payo¤ of any individual is still equal to 1. The reason is that the proponent always o¤ers to conduct the relation in the common native language and o¤ers the respondent a compensation equal to 1 , which is always accepted and yields 1 + to the proponent.
The equilibrium outcome in heterogeneous matches will depend on the regime.
Under AB S must be used in any heterogeneous partnership: If the S speaker is the proponent, then she o¤ers an agreement (S; x S ). The respondent accepts if and only if x S 1 : Thus, it will be accepted with probability (x S + 1) :
The proponent's optimal o¤er is the value of x S that maximizes her expected payo¤:
Hence, the optimal o¤er is x S = 1, and the associated probability of a breakdown is (1 ), as in the case with exogenous division of surplus. However, if the proponent is a W speaker, then she faces no uncertainty about the reaction of her potential partner and can capture all the potential rents. In other words, she o¤ers x S = 1 and captures 2 x S which is higher than 1 for all values of : Hence, while half of the time the same rate of ine¢ cient separations is obtained, in the other half ex-post e¢ ciency results.
In contrast to the benchmark case where the sharing rule was exogenous, in this case it is not so obvious that S speakers are in an advantageous position vis-avis W speakers. Even though S is the only feasible language of communication,
W speakers can now enjoy some informational rents: when they are proponents they are the informed party (they know the total surplus, 2 W ); and hence they are able to appropriate all the surplus. In contrast, when the S speaker is the proponent her ability to appropriate rents is limited by the asymmetry of information on W . More speci…cally, the expected payo¤s of S and W speakers are given respectively by:
By assumption (A.1) > 1 2
; and hence U S AB is lower than U W AB . The commitment to use S is dominated by the informational rents that the better informed agents (W speakers) are able to extract.
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In the RB scenario then the proponent in a heterogeneous match (say the W speaker) o¤ers a menu where x varies according to the language policy: (S; x S ) ; 27 Consequently, W speakers are more than compensated for the use of their second language.
(SW; x SW ) ; (W; x W ) : The respondent (S speaker) will choose the optimal languagemonetary return combination, provided it is higher than 1 : It turns out (details are provided in the Appendix) that if = 1 2
, in equilibrium W speakers o¤ers
, and
(SW policy is never chosen in equilibrium) and the respondent chooses W if
, and S otherwise. Hence, RB reduces the frequency of ine¢ cient separations to zero. Moreover, it reduces total language costs by increasing the use of W as the ratio of S W decreases. Summarizing, total welfare is higher in the RB scenario and both communities are better o¤. More speci…cally,
and hence with respect to the benchmark model S speakers'incentives to learn W improve.
Large cooperation groups
To what extent results change if we consider more complex organizations than two- 
is always an equilibrium. Also, for a large class of distribution functions (including the uniform density case) this will be the only one. 28 In other words, in the AB regime cooperation among members of di¤erent speech communities is not feasible.
In the RB regime if an organization adopts a monolingual policy then the above result still holds (no cooperation). However, when a bilingual policy (SW ) is adopted, an individual then will quit if and only if (1 2 ) : Hence, the equilibrium condition now becomes:
Note that from assumption 1 (and since (Gabszewicz et al. 2008) . Clearly, a lower value of B S discourages W speakers from learning S: lower W : As a result of the lower fraction of bilingual W speakers, S increases. The reason for the strategic substitutability of the learning e¤orts of the two communities is the net result of two countervailing e¤ects. As W falls, on the one hand, the communicative value of learning W increases (the probability of meeting a monoglot W speaker increases and hence knowledge of a second language becomes more important to make cooperation feasible), and on the other hand, the additional bene…ts from 28 For some distribution functions there may also exist an equilibrium with 0 < < 1 2 ; which will be ingnored in the main text.:
29 There is another rational expectations equilibrium with 0 < < 1 2 : 30 I have not discussed how language policy is chosen in multi-person organizations. Suppose an individual is chosen at random to select the language policy. She will anticipate that if she proposes S or W as the language of communication then cooperation is not feasible and will obtain 1 : However, in the RB regime, if she proposes SW it will be accepted by everyone, and she will get 1 1 .
reciprocal bilingualism decrease as the probability of having a partner that is a bilingual W speaker falls. It turns out that the …rst e¤ect dominates.
The main normative implications of the benchmark model also extend to the case of heterogeneous learning costs and low exogenous bene…ts ( S and W below 1). Since individuals do not internalize the positive externalities generated by their learning decisions the social optimum is generally characterized by values of S and W higher than in equilibrium. In this case we can best describe these positive externalities as operating through two di¤erent channels. One is related to the communicative value of languages and the other to the enhanced cooperative e¤ect of reciprocal bilingualism. A higher value of W implies: (i) an increase in the probability that a monolingual S speaker meets a bilingual W speaker (with whom communication is feasible), and (ii) an increase in the probability that a bilingual S speaker meets a bilingual W speaker, which facilitates cooperation. As a result, the entire S community bene…ts from a higher value of W : The symmetric is true if S increases.
The relative size of speech communities
Suppose a fraction of the population belongs to the S community and a fraction 1 to the W community. The e¤ect of changes in are quite straightforward.
There are two major reasons why as increases above 1 2 the social bene…ts generated by reciprocal bilingualism diminish. First, the frequency of linguistically heterogenous partnerships, (1 ) ; decreases. Second, the total learning costs increase as more individuals are asked to learn the weak language.
The e¤ect of on the equilibrium outcome is equally unsurprising. As increases S speakers have less incentives to become bilingual, as the resulting frequency of linguistically heterogeneous partnerships decreases.
Throughout this paper the "strong" language (S) has been de…ned in relation to its international status:
In most of the examples the "strong" language is also the domestically dominant language. However, if is su¢ ciently small, then W may be more frequently used and learnt more intensively than S, S > W :
For example, this seems to be the case for the French language in Quebec. In other words, it may be possible that the "weak" language (W ) ; according to our de…nition, is the dominant language in domestic interactions.
Concluding remarks
The main message of this paper is that reciprocal bilingualism is likely to raise social welfare by reducing social and economic segmentation. The underlying theory is based on three main principles. First, languages are communication devices and hence sharing one is a prerequisite for cooperation between members of di¤erent speech communities. Second, bilingual individuals are not indi¤erent about the language of use in social and economic interactions (linguistic preferences, of emotional attachment to one's native language). As a result, even if everyone is competent in a particular language, and hence the ability to communicate is not at stake, a certain degree of social and economic segmentation will remain. Third, learning a second language generates network externalities. Consequently, individuals do not internalize those externalities and hence public intervention is needed to implement the social optimum. As a result, policies that promote reciprocal bilingualism may increase social welfare by tempering the linguistic con ‡ict of interest and enhancing cooperation.
The model is able to rationalize some empirical evidence that was puzzling for traditional theories. In particular, in bilingual societies where everyone is competent in the strong language, theories based exclusively on the communicative value of languages predict no di¤erences in labor market outcomes between monolingual (only competent in the strong language) and bilingual workers (competent also in the weak language.) In contrast, the current model unambiguously predicts higher Beyond aggregate welfare, the model also points out the distributional implica-tions of various policies, which may be crucial to understand the e¤ects of alternative jurisdictional arrangements and determine their feasibility in a centralized political system.
Suppose …rst that policy decisions are taken by bodies that represent the interests of each speech community. This is more likely when the two communities are geographically segmented, like in Belgium. In Section 5 I argue that individual decisions on second language learning may cause a negative externality on other members of their speech community. As a result, policies implemented independently by each community may result in outcomes that generate very poor social welfare results, even worse than under laissez-faire. More speci…cally, decision makers ignore the positive externality that their learning e¤orts would cause on the other community, and on top of that they do further restraint their learning e¤orts taking into account their internal negative externality, aggravating the underinvestment problem. In this sense, centralized policy making is a necessary condition for designing and implementing e¢ cient policies. But it might not be a su¢ cient condition. It could be the case that reciprocal bilingualism involves higher total welfare but lower welfare for the speakers of the strong language. In fact, under majority voting the outcome will depend on the relative size of the two communities. Hence, it is possible that policies that promote reciprocal bilingualism do not receive su¢ cient political support, even though they maximize total welfare.
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More generally, the implementation of the social optimum is likely to depend on whether or not speakers of the weak language are able to …nd a way to compensate speakers of the strong language. In other words, this is an instance of the political fragility of the social optimum, which may explain why societies with high levels of reciprocal bilingualism are relatively hard to …nd.
Appendix
Heterogenous learning costs and unobservable language skills
In this Appendix we provide the analytical details of the discussion of Section 5.1.2. In principal such asymmetry of information could generate a coordination problem for linguistically homogeneous matches. However, this problem does not arise if we allow for a natural expansion of the strategy space. In particular, suppose that proponents choose one of the following strategies: (i) W preferred, but SW and S are also possible, (ii) W preferred, but SW is also possible, (iii) W only, (iv) S preferred, but SW and W are also possible, (v) S preferred, but SW is also possible, (vi) S only. Note that a W speaker will never choose strategies (iv) to (vi). Similarly, an S speaker will never choose strategies (i) to (iii). If the proponent selects an option with a single language choice, then the respondent must accept or reject. If the o¤er includes more than one feasible language choice then, in case of acceptance, the respondent must choose a particular language policy. If the respondent rejects the o¤er the partnership breaks down. Under such a strategy space it is clear that proponents will choose their strategy aiming to maximize the expected payo¤ in heterogenous groups, since they anticipate that if both potential partners share the same mother tongue they will conduct their relation in their preferred language.
32
If we let F 0 be the cost paid by the marginal individual, then in equilibrium
In a linguistically heterogenous partnership, if the proponent is a W speaker then her expected payo¤s associated to alternative o¤ers are:
(i) W preferred but S accepted:
The characterization of the optimal strategy depends on parameter values. In order to simplify the presentation let us assume that:
< then we obtain the follwing result:
Result 1 W speakers' optimal strategy as proponents is:
, and (iii) if .
Obviously, a monolingual S speaker will only accept option (i), and choose S, while a bilingual S speaker will always accept (i) and (ii), in the …rst case choosing S and in the second SW: Finally, she will accept (iii) if and only if S . The S speakers' optimal strategy in their role as proponents is analogous to that presented in Section 4. In particular, a bilingual S speaker proposes: (v) if , and (vi) if > : A monolingual S speaker; obviously always proposes S: The W speakers'acceptance rule also coincides with that of the benchmark model.
Result 1 follows from the direct comparison of these three payo¤s, taking into account the S speaker's optimal response. Hence, the W speaker's expected payo¤ is:
Similarly, the respective expected payo¤s of a bilingual and a monolingual S speaker are: 32 It is important to note that under this expanded strategy space, the assumption in the benchmark model that individuals could observe the native language and language skills of their potential partners was deemed completely irrelevant since S was either 0 or 1: 
The following assumption guarantees the existence of a unique equilibrium. Since the second term is negative, then the …rst term must be positive. This implies that (under the conditions that guarantee a unique equilibrium) the optimal value of S is smaller than in equilibrium. Since U W S is a strictly increasing function, the optimal value of S of the W community is 1. Finally, since the S community does not internalize the positive e¤ect of S on U W ; it is obvious that the value of S that maximizes total welfare is lower than the value preferred by the S community. However, it is much trickier to compare the social optimum with the equilibrium value under individual learning decisions, since total welfare is not generally concave in S . Let us consider the following example: = 1; = = The objective function of the S community is invariant in S :
Finally, the welfare of the W community is: , then the socially optimal value of S is a strictly decreasing function. As a result, the value of S chosen by the social planner is the highes, it takes a lower value when is the outcome of a game where with individual decision makers, and it is the lowest value if chosen according to the interests of the S community.
Equilibrium strategies in the RB scenario with pricemediated agreements
Following the notation in the main text, suppose that the W speaker is the proponent and the S speaker the respondent. Without loss of generality we can focus on strategies that satisfy the following inequalities: x W x W S x S 1 . If x W < x W S then the respondent will never choose W; exactly as if x W = x W S . Similarly, if x W S < x S : Finally, if x S < 1 , then again the respondent will never choose S; and might break down the match for some realizations of S . However, if x S = 1 ; then this does not raise the S speaker's opportunity cost of options W or SW; but now the S speaker may sometimes choose S and increase C speakers' payo¤ above the break down level, 1 : It is important to note that x S 1 guarantees that there are no ine¢ cient separations.
For arbitrary values of (x W ; x SW ; x S ) that satisfy the above inequalities, the respondent must select her optimal response. W will be preferred to S if and only if and SW is never chosen. In fact, the respondent chooses W if S 1 , and S otherwise. Hence, the proponent's expected payo¤ is:
The optimal proponent's strategy is the pair (x W ; x S ) that maximizes the above payo¤ function subject to x W x S 1 : From the …rst order condition for an interior solution with respect to x W we obtain:
Also, dU
which evaluated at equation (3) is negative. Hence, the optimal proponent's strategy is x S = 1 and x W = 1 + 
